Bioethics and Human Rights: A Problem, a Proposal, and an Achievement by Pleasants, Gabriel J
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/508
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2007
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Bioethics and Human Rights:
A Problem, a Proposal, and an
Achievement
Author: Gabriel J Pleasants
1Introduction: Two Models of Bioethics
We thus find ourselves at a crossroads: health care can be considered a commodity to be sold, or it 
can be considered a basic social right. It cannot comfortably be considered both at the same time. 
This, I believe, is the great drama of medicine at the start of this century. And this is the choice 
before all people of faith and good will in these dangerous times. 
Paul Farmer1
How and why, in this age of extraordinary wealth and technological advancement, do people 
routinely suffer and die from preventable and easily treatable diseases?  
 Jim Yong Kim, Joyce V. Millen, Alec Irwin, and John Gershman2
In 1990, at the age of 27, Terri Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest that would leave 
her in a persistent vegetative state for the rest of her life. Without any control over her 
body, and with questionable brain activity, Terri required round-the-clock nursing care 
and, what would prove to be crucial later on, a feeding tube. Her life was sustained in 
this way for eight years, until her husband brought the issue of discontinuing the use of 
her feeding tube to a Florida judge in 1998. Terri’s parents, the Schindlers, immediately 
initiated legal opposition, and a lengthy battle in the courts ensued. For American 
jurisprudence and bioethics, the Schiavo case did not introduce a novel issue. It  did, 
however,  force the courts to readdress one of the more complex and emotionally-
charged areas of ethics and the law.  
The Florida judiciary decided that Terri’s feeding tube could be removed, 
adhering to a legal precedent set in 1978 in New Jersey’s Quinlan case and at the federal 
level with the case of Nancy Cruzan in 1990. The Florida legislature, impelled by 
conservative religious forces, moved immediately to pass a law that would  put the power 
 
1 Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), p. 175. 
2 Jim Yong Kim, Joyce V. Millen, Allen Irwin, et al., Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health 
of the Poor (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2000), p. ix. 
2to re-insert the feeding tube into the hands of the state’s governor, Jeb Bush; he quickly 
exercised that power.  The unconstitutionality of the actions by the Florida legislature 
and executive was resoundingly decided by the Florida Supreme Court, and, in January 
of 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court let that decision stand, refusing to hear an appeal by 
Governor Bush. Terri’s right to decline medical treatment, based on the cherished ethical 
principle of autonomy, was upheld, but the public  battle over her life was just beginning. 
Terri’s parents, unwilling to see treatment end, sought to have their daughter’s 
life maintained in a persistent vegetative state. Their deeply  emotional plea was taken up 
by the religious right and the “culture of life,”3 powerful interest groups in the United 
States and in many parts of the world. Eventually, with great political and financial 
backing, this movement, with an abundance of U.S. mainstream media attention, brought 
Terri’s  case to a new and unlikely arena, the U.S. Congress. As George Annas, an expert 
on health law, bioethics, and human rights describes it: “For the first time in the history 
of the United States, Congress met in a special emergency session to pass legislation 
aimed at the medical care of one patient—Terri Schiavo. President George W. Bush 
encouraged the legislation and flew back to Washington, D.C., from his vacation in 
Crawford, Texas, so that he could be on hand to sign it immediately.”4
The new law, “Terri’s Law,” violated constitutional protections of checks and 
balances by calling for a new ruling in a federal court, directing that the seven previous 
 
3 The “culture of life” was introduced by Pope John Paul II in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae (accessed at 
<http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0141/_INDEX.HTM> on April 5, 2007), who challenged us to choose 
between it and the “culture of death.” In the United States, there has been a very strong faith-based 
following of the “culture of life,” and the concept has entered into mainstream American politics around the 
issue of abortion. 
4 George J. Annas, “‘Culture of Life’ Politics at the Bedside—The Case of Terri Schiavo,” The New 
England Journal of Medicine 352 (2005), pp. 1710-1715. 
3years of the judicial process be ignored. Appropriately, the U.S. District Court judge 
ruled that the “exhaustive” legal proceedings conducted in Florida had already 
determined the case, and Terri’s feeding tube could legally be removed. The challenge of 
her parents, grasped onto and much amplified by the “culture of life,” would fail, despite 
plenty of media attention, popular support, and U.S. government action at the highest 
levels. Terri’s legal right to refuse medical treatment was restored, and she died on 
March 31, 2005, at the age of 41.  
 
Olivia, a poor, unemployed Ghanaian woman in her early thirties, came to the 
Matthew 25 House in early March of 2006.  The house is a two hour bus ride from her 
home in a shanty-town on the outskirts of Accra, Ghana’s capital. She went there because 
she knew that the Catholic NGO was one of the few places in the country where she could 
receive free anti-retroviral drugs to halt the full-blown AIDS that was ravaging her body; 
she could not afford  the government subsidized rate of $5 a month, as many of the 
socially and economically powerless cannot in this West African nation. Weighing only 
seventy pounds (one of the most dramatic indicators of her late-stage AIDS), Olivia 
immediately began the process that would lead to getting ARV treatment. She swallowed 
her shame and went in for a barrage of tests that would give doctors the information they 
needed to put her on the precious medications. 
 Though she was by far the newest and one of the weakest members of Matthew 
25’s support community, Olivia was eager to become involved with  the group’s outreach 
programs as soon as she joined. She wanted to share her story with as many Ghanaians 
4as she could, to ensure that the tragedy that she was experiencing would not be repeated. 
It was on her first outreach program that I met her. She spoke with passion and courage 
in a country where AIDS is highly stigmatized. She told how she came to fear that she 
was infected with HIV when her husband mysteriously passed away, wracked by fevers 
and diarrhea. With little money and her body progressively weakening, Olivia’s concern 
for the welfare of her young son forced her past the social and cultural barriers to testing 
and treatment and led her to seek the help of the Matthew 25 program. 
 Olivia’s willpower was strong on the day I heard her speak, but her physical 
strength was nearing an end. She could barely stand and could not walk more than a few 
steps. Eunice, another HIV-positive woman, carried Olivia on her back. Her story was 
similar to Olivia’s, with one important exception: she had begun taking ARVs two years 
earlier and was nearly as strong as she had been before infection with HIV. Olivia was 
hopeful that she too would enjoy the “Lazarus effect” experienced by those with AIDS 
lucky enough to get treatment. Olivia, however, would not be one of the fortunate ones. 
A week after I met her, I spoke with Father Bobby Benson, the director of Matthew 25 
House, on the phone. “How is Olivia?,” I asked, “Has she got her meds yet?” The reply 
came slowly, “Oh…no. She was due to get them next week, but today…she died.” 
There is something terribly wrong with humanity today that we allow tremendous 
inequalities in health to define our world. Unequal attention, unequal treatment, and 
unequal valuing of life arise from Olivia’s and Terri’s stories. Their lives are at the 
extreme ends of the spectrum of health outcomes, but there is a monumental gap between 
5them where millions of injustices play out every day. This is most clear, most 
devastating, and most morally outraging when looking at health outcomes across the 
world. Such injustice calls into question the very project of human existence; what are we 
here for if not to care for one another, as equals? Every time we focus on the Terri 
Schiavos of the world to the exclusion of the exponentially greater number of Olivias, we 
willfully sacrifice a great portion of our humanity. 
 How does one address these great contradictions? Such stories indict our very 
capacity to be moral beings, and it is in re-claiming that morality that it is possible to 
search for solutions. In looking at health, bioethics quickly comes to mind as the 
mechanism for rectifying our moral failures. As the Schiavo case makes clear, bioethics 
is enjoying a great deal of prominence and influence in the societies of the developed 
world. But why has the discipline been so silent on issues of justice? Much of it has to do 
with the nature of the “first model of bioethics,” which, as a product of the Western 
philosophical tradition, focuses mainly on the principle of autonomy to the exclusion of 
justice. It has also made itself relevant to only a very small number of issues, grouped 
around the rapid advances in biomedicine and its technologies. Health, widely conceived, 
is considered outside the scope of bioethics, which limits itself to the patients who have 
found a place in the medical systems of the industrialized world. The millions, if not 
billions, who never become patients are ignored, and, thus, they are sentenced to suffer in 
silence. Health injustices call out for a moral response and they call bioethics to radically 
expand its purview. 
6This critique is not alone in its indictment of the first model of bioethics, and a 
new bioethical model is beginning to emerge as discontent with the old model nears a 
breaking point. Academic voices from the long-neglected developing world are joining to 
castigate bioethics’s inattention to the plight of the poor and powerless.5 Those who study 
social inequalities have recognized that they are inevitably linked to negative health 
outcomes, and that bioethics must reinvent itself in order to address this relationship in a 
spirit of social justice.6 Even more promising is that bioethicists themselves have begun 
to reflect on the purpose of the discipline if it has nothing to say about the death and 
suffering that much of the world’s people experience in a time when there are more 
resources available than ever to prevent their plight.7 The emerging bioethics has initiated 
a conversation on health, human rights, and social justice that is long past due and 
absolutely necessary if we hope to fully realize our collective humanity. 
 This analysis investigates what is wrong with the first model of bioethics by 
looking at the harm it causes on a global scale. The ethical debate around the worldwide 
ban on organ sales pits philosophers and ethicists who propose a “trade” in human organs 
against social scientists who have documented the suffering caused by international organ 
“trafficking.” Market advocates rest their argument on the dominant principle of the first 
model of bioethics, which is autonomy; persons reign supreme over their bodies, even 
when it comes to selling an organ. Opponents explain that the ideal of autonomy is 
 
5 Angeles Tan Alora and Josephine M. Lumitao, eds., Beyond a Western Bioethics: Voices from the 
Developing World (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001). 
6 Renee C. Fox and Judith P. Swazy, “Examining American Bioethics: Its Problems and Prospects,” 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 14 (2005), pp. 361-373. 
7 Larry R. Churchill, “Are We Professionals? A Critical Look at the Social Role of Bioethicists,” Daedalus 
128 (1999), pp. 253-274. 
7merely illusory, and that the social and economic realities of organ vendors make the 
decision to sell an organ not an individual “choice,” but actually exploitation.  
The failure of bioethics, in the organ case, is not simply a lack of attention to 
injustice; the crime is that its theory serves to perpetuate injustice on the vulnerable. This 
harm is caused by the discipline’s myopic vision. It focuses on Eurocentric individual 
rights without taking into account the larger social sphere that inhibits the agency of the 
powerless. Thus, many consider such a narrowly-conceived bioethics to have lost its 
grasp on what is truly moral. Bioethics tells us nothing about our responsibilities to 
others, but only about individual rights in the exclusive world of biotechnology.8 The 
new model is an attempt, then, “to bring the moral, conceived as a dimension of all 
relationships forged in the context of the lived world of local communities, in 
conversation with bioethics, seen as the application of a set of codified norms to the 
practice of medicine.”9 If bioethicists reflexively interrogate their own discipline, they 
will be able to reclaim its moral weight in action, rather than manage inequality through 
ignorance. 
The second section of the paper looks at how bioethics is reinventing itself, and it 
looks at the national case of South Africa to see how this proposal for a new bioethics is 
gaining currency. The new model of bioethics is based on using the language of human 
rights and social justice to discuss health in any context. It is founded upon an 
understanding of the social determinants of health, along with the great challenges that 
 
8 Laurie Zoloth, “Heroic Measures: Just Bioethics in an Unjust World,” Hastings Center Report 31 (2001), 
pp. 34-40. 
9 Veena Das, “Public Good, Ethics, and Everyday Life: Beyond the Boundaries of Bioethics,” Daedalus 
128 (1999), p. 99. 
8the HIV/AIDS pandemic holds for all of human society. With a new language of analysis, 
this new bioethics can explore the social history of a place as medicine would a patient, 
and it can prescribe appropriate remedial actions.  
South Africa has one of the simplest social diagnoses but the gravest health 
challenges of any of the world’s nations. The tremendous injustices of South Africa’s 
history, manifested in the evils of apartheid, have shaped to a large degree who is healthy 
and who is sick in the country today. South Africa’s HIV/AIDS pandemic shows in no 
unclear terms the way in which disease is determined by a place and a patient’s past and 
the threat it poses to their future. The application of the new bioethics in the present holds 
great promise for overturning the cycle of suffering. 
The third case, then, shows the achievement of the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) in putting this proposed bioethics into political action by campaigning for access 
to antiretroviral treatment (ARVs) in South Africa. TAC’s local activism has had 
national, regional, and global influence by passionately striving for the realization of 
health care as a human right for those infected with HIV. Using the civil and political 
rights ensured by the democratic triumph over apartheid, TAC has engaged the court 
system to challenge the lack of political will to fight AIDS as a violation of social and 
economic rights. Though TAC’s victory revolved around a single issue, access to ARVs, 
their achievement opens discussion of the right to a broader provision of social and 
economic rights. It also raises the major issue of implementation, guided by the ideal of 
universal and equitable health care. Is there an “ethics of implementation,” and how must 
we balance the radical ideal of health as a human right with the more pragmatic and 
9immediate goal of providing services to some right away? It is possible to answer these 
questions with the new model of bioethics that stresses action and obligations to others 
over individual rights. Global health equity requires, then, a more complete shift in the 
bioethical agenda and a total re-structuring of our moral priorities in health. The language 
of human rights and social justice provide the essential framework for holding this 
discussion.  
10
1. The Problem: Organ Sales and the Harm of Bioethics
Pointing out the insufficiencies of a principle-based approach to bioethics is 
certainly not a novel academic critique.1 An important new step, however, is to build on 
those critiques to show that such a model is not just theoretically inadequate, but 
unambiguously harmful as it touches the lives of those whose daily reality is anything but 
autonomous. The harm caused by the first model of bioethics is most pernicious in the 
debate around an “ethical” market in human organs. 
 Organ sales proponents rely exclusively on the first model of bioethics to carve 
out a legitimate sphere for a discussion of a “trade” in human organs. Thus, the 
cornerstone of their argument is the dominant bioethical principle of autonomy. Their 
argument is particularly insidious precisely because it is so convincing from the 
perspective of the “liberal” Western tradition. Interrogating the roots of that tradition, 
however, lays bare the ultimate harm caused by overdependence on the value that we in 
the West consider to be the bedrock of a “free” society. 
A discourse of resistance to organ sales emerged first from medical 
anthropologists in the developing world, whose work among the poor and powerless gave 
them the necessary vantage to recognize the harmful effects that organ commodification 
had on the health of the socio-economically exploited. A sizeable literature has 
chronicled the negative health outcomes that sales of organs have had on the powerless 
 
1 Barry Hoffmaster, ed., Bioethics in Social Context (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Dan W. 
Brock, “Broadening the Bioethics Agenda,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (2000), pp. 21-38; 
Leigh Turner, “Bioethics, Social Class, and the Sociological Imagination,” Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 14 (2005), pp. 374-378. 
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across the developing world. It is necessary to expose these harmful effects as direct 
results of misplaced faith in the first model of bioethics and the principle of autonomy. 
“Life for Life”? 
The argument against banning organ sales arose in the same way that many 
challenges to traditionally-held values do: as a desperate appeal in a situation of great 
moral urgency. The urgent moral crisis was and is the great gap between the number of 
patients waiting for an organ transplant and the number of transplantable organs that are 
actually available. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network presently has 
95,323 candidates on its waiting list, representing the total number of transplant 
candidates in the United States; 70,870 of these candidates are waiting for a kidney 
transplant. Only 28,931 transplants were performed in 2006, while 6,038 people died 
while waiting for a transplant.2,3 It is the moral urgency of saving thousands of lives with 
increased transplants that drives the proponents of a market in human organs, a market 
that it is believed will erase the “lethal gap” between supply and demand.4
Such a solution, however, is currently illegal in the United States, Europe, and 
much of the rest of the world. The World Medical Association and the World Health 
Organization have also made statements against organ sales. The nearly ubiquitous 
worldwide ban on a market in organs came about in the 1980s, as advances in medical 
technology made transplantation the best treatment option (as opposed to dialysis, in the 
 
2 As of March 30, 2007. Accessed at <http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp>. 
3 A. Ojo, J. Hanson , H. Meier-Kreische, et al., “Survival in recipients of marginal cadaveric donor kidneys 
compared with other recipients and wait-listed transplant patients,” Journal of the American Society of 
Nephrology 12 (2001), pp. 589-97. 
4 Arthur Caplan, “Transplantation at Any Price,” American Journal of Transplantation 4 (2004), pp. 1933-
1934. “Lethal gap” is Caplan’s term, but he is actually an opponent of organ sales. 
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case of renal disease). The rationale behind such a ban was less a thoughtful discussion of 
ethics and values than it was an immediate and emotional response of moral repugnance 
to the idea of selling an organ. The ban rested on the presumed moral high ground that 
organ sales were a basic violation of human dignity. With transplantation still a novel 
procedure and relative benefits versus other treatments still in doubt (transplantation was 
considered best, but not by much), any questioning of the moral assumption of the ban on 
sales remained outside of the ethical arena.5
Twenty years later, however, a sizeable minority of ethicists and philosophers 
have brought the possibility of a market in organs into mainstream bioethical discussion. 
At present, transplantation is, incontrovertibly, the best treatment option for many 
conditions, especially end-stage renal disease. Improvements in immunosuppressive 
capabilities and infection prophylaxis have led to survival rates that are better than those 
for dialysis as well as less traumatic for the patient.6 Financial compensation for living 
donors has come to be seen as a realistic option for solving the organ shortage, especially 
as survival rates for recipients of transplanted organs from living donors have outpaced 
those for organs obtained from cadavers.7 One year after the transplant, there is a 97.9% 
survival rate for patients who obtained kidneys from living donors compared to an 94.5% 
survival rate when the kidney was obtained from a cadaver. After five years, the trend is 
more striking, with kidneys from living donors correlating to a 90.2% survival rate as 
 
5 Arthur J. Matas, “The Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections, and Concerns,” in The 
American Journal of Transplantation, 2004 (4), pp. 2007-2017. 
6 R.A. Wolfe, V.B. Ashby, E.L. Milford,  et al., “Comparison of mortality in all patients on dialysis, 
patients on dialysis awaiting transplantation, and recipients of a first cadaveric transplant,” New England 
Journal of Medicine 341 (1999), pp. 1725-1730. 
7 P.I. Terasaki, M. Cecka, D.W. Gjerston,  et al., “High survival rates of kidney transplants from spousal 
and living unrelated donors,” New England Journal of Medicine 333 (1995), pp. 333-336. 
13
opposed to 82.0% for kidneys from cadavers.8 It is thought that a market in organs from 
living donors would reduce the lethal gap and would encourage the best possible organs 
into the donor pool. 
From a recognition of an urgent moral crisis on the demand side of the equation, 
those who propose a market solution move to address where saleable organs would come 
from. It is not the economically secure, to be sure, who are most likely to part with a 
“spare” kidney. Putting their faith in the “free market,” proponents insist that organ sales 
would be beneficial both for those who receive organs and those who provide them. 
Transplant recipients would get the optimal life-saving treatment, while the organ sellers 
would receive a considerable monetary sum9 that would greatly improve their economic 
situation. That the poor alone would be organ vendors is irrelevant, it is believed, and 
organ sales are considered a good option for alleviating poverty. That the simple 
exchange of organ for money is enriching for all parties involved is the basic assumption 
of the “life for life” argument, and it is an attempt to achieve an unassailable moral high 
ground for a proposal that has long been contentious. 
Market advocates acknowledge an initial moral repugnance to the idea: “No 
doubt, discussing payment can be unpleasant; it would be ideal if we could increase the 
supply of kidneys without resorting to payment. However, after four decades of trying to 
increase the number of kidneys, we still are left with an ever-increasing organ 
 
8 As of March 30, 2007. Accessed at <http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp>. The comparison holds 
true for transplanted livers and lungs as well, though the difference in survival rates is less striking and can 
actually prove worse in the case of lung transplants three and five years after the transplant. 
9 In one study, a “cost-effective” fixed price on purchased kidneys was pegged as high as $225,000. Arthur 
J. Matas and Mark Schnitzler, “Payment for living donor (vendor) kidneys: A cost-effectiveness analysis,” 
American Journal of Transplantation 4 (2003), pp. 216-221. 
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shortage.”10 Janet Radcliffe-Richards, a British philosopher prominent in the market 
solution school of thought, challenges that the ban on sales and all arguments against a 
market are in fact reactionary from a moral standpoint: “But what is the moral basis of 
this opposition? If you think organ selling should remain illegal, what exactly is your 
reason? Is it that you regard selling body parts as wrong in itself, irrespective of 
consequences? Or is it because you think that although it is not wrong in itself, in practice 
the harms will usually or always outweigh the benefits?”11 
Radcliffe-Richards and others caution that though the discussion of organ sales is 
morally unpalatable at first glance, the greater moral outrage, in a deeper analysis, is that 
thousands are dying on waiting lists while a potential solution is banned. The burden of 
proof, advocates of organ sales feel, should lie with those who wish to maintain these 
harmful prohibitions. The invitation is to a debate of ethical principles; proponents place 
their full trust in the dominant principle of bioethics, autonomy, and they challenge those 
favoring the ban to explain why autonomy does not include the right to sell an organ. 
The Centrality of Autonomy 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. . . . The only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others. 
John Stuart Mill12 
Reverence for the rights of the individual have a long history in the Western 
tradition. The notion of natural rights has occupied prominent thinkers since the Age of 
Revolution in the eighteenth century. Any discussion of rights in the West is based on the 
 
10 Matas (2004), p. 2008. 
11 J. Radcliffe-Richards, “Commentary: An ethical market in human organs,” Journal of Medical Ethics 29 
(2003), p. 140. 
12 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Bartleby, 1999). 
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assumption that the unit of such a discussion is the individual. The freedom of the 
individual to self-determination, be it philosophical or legal, is the gold standard of any 
Western rights-based approach. Civil and political rights maintain their hegemony vis-à-
vis social and economic ones. Bioethics, an offshoot of Western philosophy and ethics, 
has overwhelmingly focused on protecting and promoting autonomy. It underpins all 
manner of cases, including the right to die, the right to refuse treatment, and the right to 
informed consent. The principle of autonomy is the linchpin of the organ sales debate, 
and the harm it causes is directly related to its preeminence in Western thought. 
 Infringing upon one’s autonomy, Isaiah Berlin argues in his famous discussion of 
liberal values, is the worst offence one can commit against another’s humanity.13 One’s 
individual sovereignty is the very essence of what makes her or him human, according to 
the earliest conceptions of civil rights. Autonomy as freedom has led to a tendency to 
believe that individual choice is all that society is obligated to ensure. Once a person is 
free to choose, responsibility for the outcome remains in the decision-maker’s hands. 
Social obligations have little place in such an epistemology.  
 In 1979, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress laid out four principles that would 
indelibly shape the emerging field of bioethics when they published their now classic 
textbook, Principles of Biomedical Ethics: 1) the principle of nonmaleficence, the 
Hippocratic duty to do no harm; 2) the principle of autonomy; 3) the principle of 
beneficence, the duty to do good; and 4) the principle of justice.14 The approach of these 
 
13 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 136-137. 
14 The most recent edition is Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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Georgetown University ethicists would come to be known as the “Georgetown Mantra” 
and it defined the field of bioethics for the next two decades. The four principles were 
meant to provide a middle ground between moral theory and ethical practice so that 
physicians would have a guide in their relationships with their patients. The principles 
also provided a common language for bioethicists to discuss the moral dilemmas arising 
from the introduction of new medical technologies. One principle came to dominate 
ethical discussion: autonomy was the only contentious area left, after physicians 
remembered to do no harm, to do good, and to treat their patients equally.  
Autonomy is principally concerned with ensuring that patients’ rights are not 
violated as they are the most vulnerable party in the healthcare system. In one often-cited 
example, it protects the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse life-saving blood 
transfusions against the wishes of all other parties, most notably the doctors giving them 
treatment. It creates a generally applicable rule to protect patients from the dangers of 
medical paternalism and to have ultimate control over their own bodies and whatever 
treatment is provided to them. 
 A corollary of the principle of autonomy is informed consent. It has ensured that 
all patients and potential patients understand and positively agree to undergo any medical 
procedure. Since Slater v. Baker and Stapleton in 1767, patients have been afforded the 
right to knowledgeably make important medical decisions. Informed consent is primarily 
focused on the ideal physician-patient relationship, where communication and 
understanding flow freely between both parties and the patient’s decision is uncolored by 
any form of coercion. 
17
Autonomy and informed consent are given by advocates of organ sales as the 
justifications for one to be able to sell an organ. They argue that a ban on organ sales is 
unjustly depriving those who would choose to sell an organ of the right to make 
autonomous decisions regarding their own bodies. In all manner of cases, it is argued, 
individuals have the right to put their bodies in harm’s way in exchange for money that 
can be used to obtain that which they value. One author gives the example of firefighters 
and deep-sea divers, who accept an increased risk of death and injury in exchange for 
increased salary.15 If we allow individuals to subject themselves to potentially harmful 
outcomes in other cases, why would we not allow organ vendors to do the same? 
This reasoning is coupled with the knowledge that the present system of donation 
by definition makes an organ a commodity that an individual can part with. If one can 
donate a non-essential organ, then the only difference between donation and sale is an 
economic one. Organ sales should be allowed “prima facie,” then, because the law 
already permits legal donation and because sales of other parts of human bodies are 
allowed, such as blood, sperm, and eggs. The “motive of monetary self-interest,” they 
argue, is not in itself illegal. Therefore, the sale of an organ could not be illegal.16 
The argument then turns to the perceived situation of the organ vendors, whose 
autonomy is in question. In many cases, potential organ vendors are “anxious to sell.” 
Denying them this right to sell is harmful to them, just as it is harmful to those who die 
on the waiting list without receiving these available organs. It is Western paternalism to 
 
15 J. Savulescu, “Is the sale of body parts wrong?,” Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (2003), pp. 138-139. 
16 M.B. Gill, R.M. Sade, “Paying for kidneys: the case against prohibition,” Kennedy Institute for Ethics 
Journal 12 (2002), pp. 17-45. 
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maintain that the poor, who are usually as desperate to sell a kidney as someone on the 
waiting list is to receive one, be deprived of one choice to improve their economic 
situation.17 Limiting the available options, as a prohibition on sales does, infringes upon 
autonomy while making it harder for the poor to “develop.”  
 Organ sales advocates fear that much of the debate ignores the reality that an 
unregulated market already exists. This illegal and decidedly global black market often 
has a negative effect on donors, who are underpaid, exploited, and very poorly cared for 
after the primary transaction occurs. Not only does the existence of this market provide 
proof of the economic desire for organ sales, but some believe that the creation of a legal 
market would be able to solve the problems that characterize the black market. The legal 
market would be supported by regulatory institutions that would ensure that organ sales 
benefited both parties. Market proponents suggest “a central purchasing system, to 
provide screening, counselling, reliable payment, insurance, and financial advice.”18 
Within the school that supports a market solution, there is a fair amount of debate 
over what an ethical market would look like. Such a discussion recently took place in the 
pages of the Journal of Medical Ethics among ethicists and philosophers from UK. 
Charles Erin and John Harris co-authored an article that outlined the “bare bones” of an 
ethical market in human organs: “the market would be confined to a self governing 
geopolitical area such as a nation state or indeed the European Union… There would be 
only one purchaser, an agency like the National Health Service (NHS), which would buy 
 
17 J. Radcliffe-Richards, A.S. Daar, R.D. Guttman, et al., “The case for allowing kidney sales,” Lancet 352 
(1998), pp. 1950-1952. 
18 Ibid., p. 1951. 
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all organs and distribute according to some fair conception of medical priority.”19 Any 
regulation of a market is meant to protect the well-being of organ vendors while still 
enticing a sufficient number of organs into the health system. Radcliffe-Richards counters 
with a more extreme vision:  
Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to rich; 
but that is not enough to settle the all-things-considered question of whether it should be allowed. 
Much international trade is currently objectionable on the same grounds, but simply stopping it 
would be worse for the poor countries. It is much better, for them, to improve the conditions of 
trade than to prevent it altogether. Is the case different with organs?20 
Her argument makes clear that, at root, an argument for organ sales is founded on the 
basic ideology that individuals are completely autonomous over themselves and the free 
market is the means to progress.  
Against Harmful Sales 
In general, the circulation of kidneys follows established routes of capital from South to North, 
from East to West, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white 
ones, and from female to male or from poor, low status men to more affluent men. 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes21 
Opposition to organ sales is driven by a perspective that focuses on the social 
determinants of health and illness with a truly global lens. They explore the political, 
economic, cultural, and historical context that must be applied to the organ trade 
phenomenon. Critical medical anthropologists and investigative journalists were the force 
behind this initial push, with a limited number of ethicists now joining the fray. At root, 
opponents of organ sales share common ground with those who advocate for a market 
 
19 Charles A. Erin and John Harris, “An ethical market in human organs,” Journal of Medical Ethics 29 
(2003), pp. 137-138. 
20 Janet Radcliffe-Richards (2003), p. 140. 
21 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “Keeping an eye on the global traffic in human organs,” Lancet 361 (2003), pp. 
1645-48. 
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solution. They too are disturbed by the lethal gap between the demand and supply of 
organs, and they recognize the inability of the altruistic donation system to close it. They 
believe, however, that a market in organs is not an appropriate solution to the organ 
shortage. Based on their observations of the unregulated black market, these opponents of 
organ sales are unwilling to accept the moral and social consequences of a regulated 
system that pays for kidneys and slices of parts of healthy livers. Those who oppose 
organ sales examine the forces that provoke desperate vendors to sell their body parts, 
and they attempt to determine the implications for global society. They too identify a 
moral crisis, but it is for the exploited organ sellers that they voice this concern. 
Bioethics’s ignorance of the social context of the organ debate allows it to be used to 
perpetuate inequality rather than resolve it. 
 In following those on the political-economic margins, the Organs Watch team at 
the University of California, Berkeley has provided the clearest picture of the unregulated 
black market traffic in human organs. They have concluded that far from being an 
autonomous choice on the model of John Stuart Mill or Isaiah Berlin, the decision to sell 
a kidney or other organ is one that is forced on society’s most vulnerable through socio-
economic forces and the demand created by the organ shortage in developed countries. 
Instead of a positive, “life for life” choice that raises organ sellers up out of their 
conditions of poverty and marginalization, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (a leading medical 
anthropologist) and others have found that the decision to sell an organ is in fact a non-
choice produced by those conditions; it almost always marginalizes organ sellers further. 
The primacy of the greater social context is underscored by an article on Iraq that 
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appeared as that country began to plummet into chaos: “Black market organ trade is 
Iraq’s new growth industry.”22 Rather than drive taxis or become policemen for fear of 
suicide bombers and death squads, young Iraqi men have found that their best option is to 
have their kidneys removed and sold in dingy Baghdad hospitals for as little as $700. 
This choice is directly linked to the increasing instability of their society. 
Arthur Caplan, an American bioethicists who worked towards a ban on organ 
sales in the United States in the 1980s, also refutes the premise that an organ market 
would be founded on a respect for autonomy: “On ethical grounds, . . . the issue is not the 
rational capacity of the seller, but the likely absence of real alternatives.”23 There are 
other situations in which the poor must resort to extreme means out of desperation for 
money. We do not hold these choices up as models of rational choice. Caplan provides 
the example of those who resort to selling their children to survive; certainly it is not 
okay just because it relieves some of the immediate poverty of the oppressed. The 
decision to sell an organ is not much different. The New York Times journalist Larry 
Rohter gives us a poor Brazilian’s appraisal of his options: “In order not to have to steal 
or kill, I thought it best to sell my kidney.”24 Structural violence forces these terrible 
decisions on the poor, and it makes them vulnerable to the attendant suffering of a kidney 
donation in the developing world.  
 Much of the Indian experience with organ sales (which were legal there until 
1994), was unearthed by Lawrence Cohen in his work there as a medical anthropologist 
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for Organs Watch.25 His interviews with Indian women who sold their kidneys in 
Chennai reveal, at first glance, an element of choice: “Yes, I would do it again if I had 
another to give.” Their addendum, however, captures their diminished agency: “I would 
have to.” Scheper-Hughes explains why the bioethical model fails with regard to organ 
sales, since it lacks the appropriate social context: “Bioethical arguments about the right 
to buy or sell an organ or other body part are based on Euro-American notions of contract 
and individual choice. But these create a semblance of ethical choice in an intrinsically 
unethical context.”26 Autonomy can be applied in ideal circumstances, but it is harmful 
rather than helpful in the context of exploitation and oppression that defines vulnerable 
lives.  
The arguments for an organ trade theorize that monetary incentives would prove 
nothing but beneficial to organ vendors. Those who compile ethnographies of the 
experiences of actual organ vendors, however, find a much different reality. Ethical 
arguments for sales focus on the primary transaction of organ for money, while extensive 
follow-up interviews catalogue the devastating secondary phenomena that often 
accompany the sale of an organ. Cohen explains that, “the problem with an ethical 
argument of this sort is the unrelenting presumption that ethics can be reduced to a 
primary transaction.”27 His research shows that social and economic forces both 
determine the “choice” to sell for Indians in “kidney belts” and where the money will go 
afterwards. Moneylenders in these areas push more aggressively for debts to be paid, 
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knowing that the extremely poor have at least one available asset, an extra kidney. One 
half of the “life for life” equation is upheld, in that the kidney takes a straight path from 
the poor seller to the affluent buyer, but the money meant to pull the seller out of poverty 
is diverted into the hands of brokers and debt collectors. 
 South Africa’s Sunday Times tells the story of Alberty da Silva’s money, after the 
poor Brazilian sold his kidney to a middle-aged woman in Brooklyn: 
Then, Da Silva’s cash evaporated.  His two former girlfriends, the mothers of his children, made 
off with a large chunk of it and, with what remained, Da Silva bought a used car to look for work.  
When he couldn’t meet the monthly payments, he downgraded to an old jalopy.  When the jalopy 
broke down almost immediately, he traded it for a second-hand bicycle.  The bicycle and a pair of 
running shoes are all he has left to show for the sale of his kidney—that, and a huge, disfiguring, 
sabre-like scar across his midsection.28 
In economic terms, Da Silva is just barely better off having sold his kidney. But a 
bioethical analysis leaves out another important aspect. Embodied social suffering must 
be taken into account to give a full picture of the individual consequences of selling one’s 
kidney. The immediate suffering of the surgery itself is also raised by this case. Both Da 
Silva and the Brooklyn buyer were flown into South Africa to illegally undergo the 
operation. She was put up in a five-star hotel before and for a week after the surgery. He, 
on the other hand, was put in a dingy apartment and quickly flown back to Brazil. The 
inequities in treatment before and after the surgery put into question the procedure itself. 
One can only speculate, but it would not be unreasonable to assume that the surgeons 
might be a bit less painstaking with the powerless Brazilian vendor. 
 The suffering of those who sell their organs is not only physical, but also 
emotional. In Moldova, young kidney sellers demonstrate one distressing example of 
 
28 Suthentira Govender and Jocelyn Maker, “Selling his only ‘spare’ asset,” Sunday Times (21 August 
2005), p. 8. 
24
social ostracism and stigmatization, but one that is far from unique. One man in his late 
twenties said: “They call us prostitutes. . . . Actually, we are worse than prostitutes 
because we have sold something we can never get back. We are a disgrace to our families 
and to our country.”29 Moldovan kidney sellers suffer consequences with their families, 
their work, their religion, and even potential marriages. In addition to social pain, they, 
like many kidney sellers in the developing world, are unable to access medical care for 
any post-operative complications. They often receive inferior care throughout the whole 
transplantation process, and, in some instances, they will even be refused follow-up care 
at the very hospitals that took their kidney and gave it to someone else. 
 The ultimate fallacy of the “life for life” argument is evident from a recent Indian 
study of 305 individuals who sold kidneys in Chennai. The results proved that organ 
vendors were worse off both economically and health-wise, hardly the ideal situation 
proposed by Western ethicists and philosophers: 
Ninety-six percent of participants sold their kidneys to pay off debts. The average amount received 
was $1070. Most of the money received was spent on debts, food, and clothing. Average family 
income declined by one third after nephrectomy, and the number of participants living below the 
poverty line increased. Three fourths of participants were still in debt at the time of the survey. 
About 86% of participants reported a deterioration in their health status after nephrectomy. 
Seventy-nine percent would not recommend that others sell a kidney.30 
Undoubtedly, the evidence obtained from social scientists disproves the claim that organ 
vendors would benefit economically from organ sales without any deterioration in their 
health. Instead, organ sales ensure that the poor are further exploited and that they are 
actually worse off as the wealthy benefit from their suffering. 
 
29 Scheper-Hughes (2003), p. 1647. 
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It is undeniable that organs have become a precious commodity for those who 
need a transplant and for those who are desperate enough for money to sell one. In many 
parts of the developing world, “the kidney as a commodity has emerged as the gold 
standard in the new body trade, representing the poor person’s ultimate collateral against 
hunger, debt, and penury.”31 Social scientists remind us that the organ trade phenomenon 
can be subject to an ethical discussion only if the social context that it is embedded in is 
truly considered. 
The Failure of Bioethics 
Why, then, does bioethics permit such a debate to rage on and even gain in 
prominence as the shortage in transplantable organs grows? The South African bioethicist 
Solomon Benatar gives some answers by critiquing the “inadequate and narrow” 
framework of his own discipline:  
First, the focus on saving lives is myopic, with the lives of the most privileged in the world 
receiving most attention. Secondly, the debate is firmly set within a value system in which market 
values dominate. Thirdly, health is considered from a highly individualistic perspective with little 
understanding of the importance of social solidarity in health. Finally, a constricted moral 
vocabulary is used to discuss the ethics of organ sales. 32 
Recognizing its own shortcomings is a harsh and difficult task for bioethics, but a healthy 
reflexivity will ultimately make the discipline stronger. Benatar and others don’t suggest 
discarding bioethics as irrelevant to health and morality. Rather, they propose that 
bioethics reshape its priorities and expand its vision. The organ sales debate is a 
disheartening and harmful failure. But the most important lesson to be gleaned is that 
bioethics must seek new ways of looking at health across the globe. Recent developments 
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in the field show that bioethics is beginning to do just that. In reinventing itself, bioethics 
is gaining the potential to benefit vulnerable populations instead of exploiting them. 
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2. The Proposal: Bioethics, Health, and Human Rights
Recognizing the harm and failure of the first model of bioethics is but a diagnosis. 
The obligation, then, is to find an ethical remedy that can address the plight of exploited 
organ vendors and make the health of the socially invisible, like Olivia, a moral priority. 
In the past decade, a comprehensive proposal for a new bioethics has begun to surface. 
This new model coalesced around three main insights. The first is a development that 
built on the long-standing recognition in public health, that health outcomes are very 
often socially determined. The added insight was that this did not simply provide a way 
to analyze public health, but that it proved that inequalities in health throughout the world 
are largely a product of systematic injustices; any solution would have to address the 
social roots of inequality.1 The second insight was the “exceptional” nature of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. The challenges that it poses call for a much more effective way of 
analyzing and improving global health, and the failure to adequately respond has been a 
moral failure of the highest order. The final insight, and the one that would give the new 
model of bioethics its language and theoretical framework, came from Jonathan Mann 
whose work as a public health official battling the HIV/AIDS pandemic gave him the 
broad perspective necessary to tie the developments in global health together. He 
proposed that the language of human rights must become central to public health and 
ethics in order to move towards health equity in the global arena and responding in the 
best way to the juggernaut of HIV/AIDS.2
1 Giovanni Berlinguer, “Bioethics, health, and inequality,” Lancet 364 (2004), pp. 1086-1091. 
2 Jonathan M. Mann, “Medicine and public health, ethics and human rights,” Hastings Center Report 27 
(1997), pp. 6-14. 
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The result is an emerging discourse in bioethics that is able to discuss health as a 
human right, universally. This analysis will outline the development of this new bioethics 
and apply it on a national scale to South Africa, a country where social history and 
present realities invariably shape health outcomes, where the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
influences all things, and where a human rights analysis of health is desperately needed. 
The Social Determinants of Health 
Modern medicine generally does an excellent job of telling us how people become 
sick: AIDS is caused by a microscopic virus that weakens our immune systems, 
ultimately making us vulnerable to and unable to fight off other illnesses; high 
cholesterol is partly a result of the information coded in our DNA and partly a result of 
the foods we eat; cancer is the abnormal growth of our bodies’ own cells, which can be a 
product of bad habits (like smoking), carcinogens in our environment (like radiation), or 
mechanisms science doesn’t yet understand. What medicine can’t tell us is why many 
people become sick because this is dependent on myriad forces that shape the reality of 
everyday life.  
Broadening our analytical perspective to include social realities gives us a much 
different picture of the preceding medical conditions. The foods that are high in fat and 
cholesterol are often the cheapest ones in the supermarket or fast-food restaurants, and 
thus they are the most cost-effective option for the poor in wealthy countries, like the 
United Sates; consequently they are purchased, ironically, on the grounds that they 
provide the best means of survival. In turn, the low prices of highly processed foods are 
heavily dependent on the political history of the U.S. farm bill that subsidizes farmers to 
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overproduce crops like corn and soy from which those foods are derived.3 Cancer caused 
by the environmental damage done by industry, like contaminated water or air pollution, 
overwhelmingly effects the poor, whose low incomes put them in the cheap housing near 
industrial centers and whose lack of political voice prevents their complaints from being 
heard.4 AIDS transmission is determined by much more than the HI virus’s ability to 
penetrate the body’s defenses: a girl sold into prostitution in an Indian slum by her 
desperate parents, will not simply attribute her HIV positive status to a sexual act, but 
will also point to the economic forces that drove her parents’ farm into ruin and the 
cultural stigma of her gender that made her an expendable person.5,6 Health is much more 
than the biological processes that effect individual bodies; it includes the social 
environment in which we live, national political history, and many other aspects of 
human interaction. 
The ways in which we experience illness and good health, strength and suffering, 
are bound up in the social forces that mold human life. The complexities of social, 
cultural, economic, and political interactions on local, national, and global scales must be 
the framework used to analyze health outcomes. This is by no means a simple task. It 
requires facility with a great many disciplines as well as the humility to realize that no 
single discipline has a monopoly on the right answers. Two that have been especially 
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adept at exploring the social determinants of health are public health and medical 
anthropology. Since the early 19th century, public health has recognized the basic 
relationship between social conditions and health, and much more recently, social 
epidemiology emerged as a way to study how social position structures risk for disease.7
The relatively young discipline of medical anthropology has also shed light on the many 
forces that determine health outcomes. Its ambitious agenda relies on ethnographies of 
vulnerable individuals to investigate “the destructive signature of poverty and oppression 
on the individual and social bodies.”8 Inquiry ranges from the medical significance of 
unique cultural modes of thought to the political and economic histories of nations and 
particular communities.  
As leaders in the movement to see health in a social context, public health and 
medical anthropology have important theoretical lessons for a bioethics that wishes to be 
truly relevant to the complexities of human health. More importantly, perhaps, is the 
passion for justice and health equity that guides many public health strategies and the 
academic activism of medical anthropology. Analytical accuracy is a first step, but 
finding solutions to the negative health outcomes created by social inequality is essential. 
“Socializing” bioethics is a precondition for ultimately working towards justice in 
health.9
7 Nancy E. Kass, “Public Health Ethics: From foundations and frameworks to justice and global public 
health,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32 (2004), p. 235. 
8 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping: The violence of everyday life in Brazil (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), p. 533 
9 Paul Farmer and Nicole Gastineau Campos, “New Malaise: Bioethics and Human Rights in the Global 
Era,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32 (2004), pp. 243-251. 
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At the center of a socially contextualized analysis of health is economics. Poverty 
is the root of suffering in an increasingly interconnected world: “Poverty wields its 
destructive influence at every stage of human life, from the moment of conception to the 
grave. It conspires with the most deadly and painful diseases to bring a wretched 
existence to all those who suffer from it.”10 The dynamic between poverty and illness is a 
discouraging and damaging cycle: poverty causes illness and illness causes poverty.11 
This deadly synergy applies to the poor individuals that it entraps just as easily as it 
applies to entire nations that diseases like HIV/AIDS can economically cripple. 
The inequality of the global economic system that we operate in today and that 
fuels the deadly dynamic between poverty and illness is widely recognized outside of the 
United States to be characterized by dependency of the poorer countries on the wealthier 
ones. Ideologically, the world’s most powerful and wealthy country refuses to 
acknowledge the harm that its “progress” has caused. One of the founders of the 
dependency theory, the Brazilian economist Theotonio Dos Santos, explains its main 
points: In the colonial and financial-industrial periods, the economies of Latin American 
and other of today’s developing countries were ravaged by the exportation of precious 
natural resources, material and human. This created enormous profit for the developed 
countries of the world, elsewhere described as the “core”.  In turn, allowing the core 
countries to further entrench their dominance vis-à-vis the “periphery”, made up of many 
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of the countries that we consider underdeveloped today, resulted in a process of growing 
inequality.12 It is this global inequality that allows the powerful to be healthy, on the 
whole, and this privileged position is directly connected to the suffering experienced by 
the poor and powerless.  
Jim Kim and his colleagues at the Institute for Health and Social Justice have 
compiled one of the largest volumes detailing how global health is negatively influenced 
by neo-liberal economic policies and the resulting global inequality. The title, Dying for 
Growth, leaves no mystery as to the effects of an economic system that puts progress 
ahead of human rights. From sub-Saharan Africa, to Latin America, to post-Soviet 
Russia, the authors outline the deleterious outcomes that result from systematic poverty, 
crushing individual and public debt, and national economic restructuring in the aftermath 
of Communism’s fall.13 The direct causal link between poverty and illness finds its 
substance in the myriad studies of health among the poor. The link also calls into 
question all of the notions of progress and development that come out of the developed 
world. How should we gauge successful societies, when economic growth and 
inequalities are causing death and suffering? Economists like Jeffrey Sachs and Amartya 
Sen, explore the other side of the coin, but reach a similar conclusion about the 
inadequacy of their own discipline to gauge human progress. 
Denial of social and economic rights, like the rights to education, housing, and 
healthcare, to the people of the developing world and the marginalized populations here 
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in the developed world, are essentially “unfreedoms” that entrench the place at the 
bottom of society for the most vulnerable.14 This is the illness causes poverty link; as 
long as social systems are designed in such a way that some have access to healthcare and 
others do not, those who are denied their human rights will remain in poverty. On a 
global scale, those countries on the margins of the world system where disease and illness 
are rampant will be unable to ever equally enjoy the enormous amounts of wealth that 
characterize the world; it is the unequal distribution of that wealth that causes illness and 
that illness perpetuates. 
Health is not only influenced by global economics, but also the social and cultural 
systems in which individuals live and which to a large degree determine daily life. 
Poverty, though, is still all too often the determining factor in who lives and who dies. 
Medical anthropology has done an excellent job of explaining how social and cultural 
forces shape health in societies throughout the world.15 Christopher Taylor gives an 
excellent example from Rwanda of the social and cultural understandings of health and 
illness and the relation to HIV/AIDS. Bodily fluids in Rwanda are understood in terms of 
“flow” and “blockage,” which are constantly adding to or detracting from the “fractal” 
person through human interactions.16 Flow is considered to be positive and pure, while 
blockage is negative and polluting. The exchange of bodily fluids during sexual 
intercourse in Rwanda is predicated on this understanding. When applied to 
contraception, condoms, in this cosmology, are seen as creating an unwelcome 
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“blockage” and destroying the “flow” of the sexual act. This deeply cultural 
conceptualization has a very concrete and negative impact on the use of condoms and, 
consequently, the efforts to halt the spread of HIV. Cultural practices, like unclean 
circumcisions and virginity testing, also have a great effect on health. These particular 
studies show the need for cultural respect and understanding, but the cultural effects on 
health are most clear in a nearly universal phenomenon: the marginalization and 
consequent powerlessness of women.  
The devastating health outcomes experienced by marginalized women come to 
the fore when looking at reproductive health. The HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan 
Africa shows that women are at a disadvantage both culturally and economically. 
Practices like widow inheritance, where women are passed on to a male family member 
of their dead husband (often from AIDS), spread HIV as well as entrench the inability of 
women to make their own sexual decisions. The cultural powerlessness of women to 
control condom use strips away protection from females who are already more 
physiologically vulnerable to sexually-transmitted infections. Social inferiority and the 
resulting poverty and lack of education experienced by many women results in “survival 
sex.”17 On an HIV prevention outreach program in Ghana, a young woman told how she 
had sex with an older man for money, knowing full well the dangers of AIDS; she needed 
the money as capital to start a hair-dressing business, and she knew that, as a woman, 
there was no other way to get it. HIV/AIDS hits women harder in part because of their 
cultural role as caretakers. Not only are they more vulnerable to becoming infected with 
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HIV, but they are the ones who must care for those sick with AIDS and the orphans of 
those who have already died from it. The oppressive forces of gender discrimination 
structure women’s vulnerability to illness. 
What frameworks have been devised for understanding the social determinants of 
health, like economics and culture? Paul Farmer and other medical anthropologists 
suggest the perspective of “structural violence,” or the “violence of everyday life.” It 
leads to a greater understanding of individually embodied suffering by explaining that 
“suffering is ‘structured’ by historically given (and often economically driven) processes 
and forces that conspire—whether through routine, ritual, or, as is more commonly the 
case, the hard surfaces of life—to constrain agency.”18 Different “axes of oppression,” 
like gender, race, and especially poverty, help us to understand who is more like to 
experience social and physical suffering.  
An even more comprehensive framework that builds on the concept of structural 
violence, is looking at the effects of “instability.” Fuller and Keenan explain that social 
marginalization is analytically inadequate when the entire fabric of vulnerable lives is 
defined by a lack of stability. They describe as unstable the lives of:  
Those who are effected by civil strife, military incursions or liberation armies in Uganda, Haiti, 
Sudan, or the Congo; those who are refugees in any part of the world; those who are the victims of 
natural disasters; those in the prisons of Russia; those married to South African or Indian truck 
drivers who themselves live in very unstable worlds; those in debt-ridden nations on the verge of 
economic collapse; heads of families forced to migrate for employment, and those at home who 
await them; those who are drug addicts, whose own apprehension of themselves is itself unstable; 
those who are forced into sexual activity to support their children, their families, or their school 
fees; those who are overseas workers and fishermen; those who engage in clandestine homosexual 
activity in homophobic societies; or those girls and young women who are faithful to their 
marriages or to other stable sexual relationships but whose husbands or partners put them at risk 
because of external sexual liaisons.19 
18 Farmer (2003), p. 33. 
19 Fuller and Keenan (2005), p. 104.  
36
Unstable lives defy simple categorization, but, in that way, the instability thesis is readily 
applicable to every individual and does not exclude any vulnerable person because of a 
narrow theoretical perspective. Looking at the social context of health and illness through 
the lenses of structural violence and instability gives one a much greater appreciation of 
the myriad factors that determine why a person is healthy or sick. Bioethicists in the 
developing world have suggested that the discipline will only serve the interests of all 
when it addresses the social realities of poverty, inequality, and all forms of instability.20 
HIV/AIDS and the Social Fault Lines 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is the definitive example of a disease determined by 
social forces. It overwhelmingly attacks the poor in the world’s poorest nations, women 
where they are most powerless, and it makes a bee-line for those living in instability in 
the most unstable parts of the world. On a macro-level, the pandemic is “a reflection of a 
complex trajectory of social and economic forces that create widening global disparities 
in wealth and health.”21 Instability and inequality in the global economic system ensures 
that those suffering from poverty anywhere, be it on the streets of New York City or the 
townships of South Africa, are at a greater risk of becoming infected with HIV and 
eventually dying from AIDS. The pandemic is woven into a complex embroidery that is 
at once tied to massive global forces and also to the most intimate areas of human 
 
20 Solomon R. Benatar, “Bioethics: Power and Injustice,” Bioethics 17 (2003), pp. 387-398; Florencia 
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21 Solomon R. Benatar, “The HIV/AIDS Pandemic: A Sign of Instability in a Complex Global System,” 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (2002), p. 163. 
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culture.22 The “exceptional” impact and challenges of the pandemic are underpinned by 
its being completely caught up in the social and economic currents of life. 
 Peter Piot enunciated the reasons why those who have had any experience with 
HIV/AIDS fear its unprecedented nature and are astounded that the response has, thus 
far, been low on the priority list of much of the world: “This pandemic is exceptional 
because there is no plateau in sight, exceptional because of the severity and longevity of 
its impact, and exceptional because of the special challenges that it poses to effective 
public action.”23 Those who live in the world of AIDS and have felt its cold touch know 
all too well that humanity has never before experienced such a pandemic. 
In this global era of interconnectedness and advancement in medical technologies 
especially, the world allows the HIV/AIDS pandemic to spread seemingly unchecked 
through the dependent and exploited developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, is home to the majority of HIV-infected people, and the countries there have 
already borne the brunt of the millions of deaths AIDS causes each year.24 If left 
unchecked, AIDS will only continue to claim lives in astronomical numbers. The true 
moral failure is that these deaths are largely preventable; the millions that have already 
occurred, and the many millions more that are forecast. A just and human response calls 
for a great deal of political will and collective action. It was this impetus that drove 
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Jonathan Mann to suggest that the language of human rights be used to discuss the public 
health and ethics of the HIV/AIDS crisis and global health more generally.  
Introducing the Language of Human Rights and Social Justice 
As a public health official working in the field of HIV/AIDS, Jonathan Mann was 
intimately aware of the social determinants of disease as well as the exceptional nature 
and the exceptional response required to fight the pandemic of our times: 
To move forward, there must be a mixture of the pragmatic and the theoretical, and a blend of 
insight and practical experience. Once we have determined that for HIV/AIDS, as for all other 
health problems, the major determinants are societal, it ought to be clear that since society is an 
essential part of the problem, a societal-level analysis and action will be required. In other words, 
the new public health considers that both disease and society are so interconnected that both must 
be considered dynamic. An attempt to deal with one, the disease, without the other, the society, 
would be inherently inadequate.25 
Mann’s great insight was to integrate medicine, public health, and bioethics by 
introducing the language of human rights: 
Fortunately, entirely outside the domain of public health or biomedical science, a series of 
concepts and a framework for identifying the societal preconditions for health had been developed. 
The modern movement of human rights, born in the aftermath of the Holocaust in Europe and 
born of the deep aspiration to prevent a recurrence of government sponsored violence, provides 
AIDS prevention with a coherent conceptual framework for identifying and analyzing the societal 
root causes of vulnerability to HIV. It also provides both a common vocabulary for describing the 
commonalities that underlie the specific situations of vulnerable people around the world, and a 
clarity about the necessary direction of health-promoting societal change.26 
This seminal insight overcame disciplinary particularities in order to work towards the 
realization of health as a human right, which should be the goal of medicine, public 
health, and bioethics if they are guided by a spirit of justice. 
 This insight has had very concrete results for bioethics. The agenda is starting to 
shift, so that issues of health equity are being presented by an energetic minority of 
 
25 Jonathan Mann, “Human Rights and AIDS,” Jonathan Mann et al., eds., Health and Human Rights (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), p. 222. 
26 Ibid. 
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bioethicists as a moral and disciplinary priority. It has also opened up dialogue with other 
traditions and other disciplines. Anthropologists, like Paul Farmer and others, have a 
coherent framework that makes possible an ethical discussion of the human right to 
health. Deans of the old school of bioethics are starting to accept the need for an ethics 
that can talk about the public health of communities, rather than just biomedical science 
as it concerns individuals.27 So too have those in public health come to the realization that 
they must couple their longstanding pillars of community and social determinants of 
health with an investigation of how the priority of justice fits with these and calls for new 
ways of seeing public health action.28 This shift in public health includes essential 
dialogue and overlap with bioethics. 
Mann also extended his invitation to dialogue to other moral traditions, like the 
Roman Catholic one, in the spirit of the shared value of “human well-being.”29 The work 
of Lisa Sowle Cahill has been ground-breaking in conceptualizing the human right to 
health and bioethical dilemmas with the Catholic principles of social justice and the 
common good.30 Cahill has also helped to marry a social discourse of health with the 
Catholic tradition of justice: “AIDS is a justice issue, not primarily a sex issue. AIDS as a 
justice issue concerns the social relationships that help spread HIV and fail to alleviate 
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AIDS, relationships of power and vulnerability that are in violation of Catholic norms of 
justice and the common good.”31 Jon Fuller and James Keenan explain how the pandemic 
and the language of human rights have dramatically remodeled bioethics into a discipline 
that truly works towards justice in healthcare.32 Their own work also goes a great 
distance in exploring how the Catholic tradition truly speaks to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
on issues like needle exchange programs, condom use, and the need for education and the 
virtue of mercy in a time of AIDS.33 Mann’s call was also taken up by many different 
academic traditions and sub-groups, like feminist theorists and those looking for lessons 
for American bioethics in particular.34 
Though he introduced human rights as a common language of analysis, Mann’s 
ultimate goal was certainly not an analytical or academic one. Human rights was to 
become a language of prescription and a language of action to positively influence global 
health and to develop strategies that were effective in promoting health equity, rather than 
simply giving lip service to universal human values; the West has a long enough tradition 
of holding up human rights as moral obligations in name alone.35 This calls bioethics not 
just to enunciate the values that we should hold dear, like health as a human right, but 
how we are morally obligated to look to their implementation. Thus, a language of 
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analysis reframes and rethinks the bioethical project and also gives a whole new solution: 
ensuring global health equity and the implementation of health as a human right in a 
spirit of social justice. 
This solution answers the problem and challenge of bioethical failure in the case 
of organ sales. With the appropriate human rights language, the debate over an “ethical” 
market in organs would quickly be resolved, and bioethics would focus itself on areas of 
greater priority. One such area is the state of healthcare and the effects that the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic are having in South Africa, a little over a decade after the end of 
apartheid. First examining the social history of the patient and place will provide the 
appropriate context for attempting a human rights solution. 
History of the Patient/Place: The Rainbow Nation 
In 1994, landmark political and civil change came to South Africa. After 46 years 
of apartheid rule, Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s first democratically elected 
leader. With political and civil freedom for the first time in generations, the African 
majority, oppressed and exploited since the arrival of the first Europeans in the fourteenth 
century, felt a new, nearly boundless optimism. They thought it only natural, only just, 
that the country’s resources be put in their hands. After generations of apartheid rule, they 
would be able to live in better conditions than the ones that they had known in the 
shantytowns and townships surrounding the urban centers of white privilege. There 
would be electricity, running water, education, food, and healthcare. There was no lack of 
political will: Mandela and his African National Congress were from and for the 
exploited African majority. At the core of the struggle against apartheid was the yearning 
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for social and economic rights, and it was expected that they would be afforded to 
millions who had never known them before. Without social and economic progress, the 
civil and political gains of the early 1990s would represent only so many empty promises. 
Unfortunately, the “New South Africa” ran smack into a global capitalist 
economic system flexing its muscles after the fall of the Soviet Union. With empty 
coffers courtesy of the bankrupt apartheid state and an international community that 
turned its back once talk came to social and economic rights, South Africa’s only 
opportunity for growth was to play by the economic rules set by the neo-liberal Western 
powers. The struggle against apartheid was for rights of human beings, widely construed: 
civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights. Ideologically, the West, in 
its push for democratization, had much to say about the former set of rights. 
Economically, however, Western faith was in a free market system, and it was up to the 
newly democratic South Africa to achieve social and economic rights on its own, on a 
very unequal playing field. 
International capitalism requires a small corps of highly skilled workers that can 
flexibly meet the demands of the international market while manipulating its advanced 
technology. Apartheid could not have set the poor black majority up for failure in this 
system any better. For generations, it had deliberately crippled the black workforce with 
inferior education and a tight hold on all access to economic skills. By apartheid’s design 
and policy, South Africa’s black majority was meant to provide a huge pool of cheap 
unskilled labor to mine gold and diamonds and otherwise serve the white minority. The 
apartheid state realized this “objective” quite effectively, so that by 1994, the workers 
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best suited to integration in the global capitalist arena were those who benefited most 
from the apartheid policies of segregation: mostly whites and a sprinkling of the other 
“races.”36 
The economic inequality that defined South Africa during the apartheid years has 
continued into its democratic era. Alistair Sparks, a South African journalist who has 
provided keen social insight for many years, describes the economy of post-apartheid 
South Africa as a double-decker bus.37 The upper deck is the small, racially-integrated, 
highly skilled workforce that can compete in international capitalism and that profits 
from it. The lower deck is the majority of the population: poor, black, and unskilled (in 
economic terms). It is extremely difficult to get from the lower to the upper deck, and it is 
certainly impossible to do so on a widespread scale without social and economic change. 
Regrettably, Sparks’s economic analysis holds true for an analysis of South African 
society on the whole.  
For those who live in South Africa, there are two worlds. To borrow development 
discourse, there is a small and isolated developed world comprised of the major urban 
centers and tourist refuges. The rest of the country, home to the vast majority of South 
Africans, is part of the developing world, and it lags far behind socially and 
economically. A long history of structural violence and instability has decided who 
belongs to which world. For the few, it is possible to receive an exceptional education 
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and world-class private healthcare while enjoying political and economic power (or, in 
fact, because of it). Or, instead of this closely-guarded luxury, one can live as the 
majority does, in shantytowns or neglected rural areas with few basic utilities, jobs for 
less than half of the labor force, and decidedly poor education and healthcare if one gets 
any at all. The only certainties are crime, poverty, AIDS, and the crushing knowledge that 
one will never get the same advantages that are enjoyed by the privileged minority, just a 
twenty minute drive away. 
The apartheid system may be dead politically, but it has only been replaced by 
social and economic apartheid. Desmond Tutu, the Nobel Peace Laureate, head of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Committee, and something akin to the spiritual and moral 
leader of the country put it well: “Unless houses replace the hovels and shacks in which 
most blacks live, unless blacks gain access to clean water, electricity, affordable health 
care, decent education, good jobs, and a safe environment…we can just as well kiss 
reconciliation goodbye.”38 His remarks referred to the process of reconciliation, but they 
can more generally be applied to the entire project of creating a new, vibrant, and humane 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
Handicapped by the global capitalist system that it was forced into and with no 
concerted international effort to ensure social and economic rights, the South Africa 
government is struggling to allocate resources to its poor. Still overwhelmingly 
Mandela’s African National Congress, it has fought to bring change with affirmative 
action business programs as well as with health and educational service outreach 
 
38 Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 274. 
45
programmes. In the 1990s, Mandela tried and failed to make access to housing, water, 
and electricity a reality for every South African. With empty state coffers and little 
economic growth, almost all of the ambitious social programs put in place after 1994 fell 
short and were abandoned. Like most other developing nations, South Africa found that 
its pleas for socio-economic progress fell largely on deaf ears. Some handouts in foreign 
aid and a multitude of NGOs were little more than a bandage on the country’s gaping 
wound.  
Nowhere are South Africa’s social and economic needs more apparent than in the 
area of healthcare. When South Africa is mentioned, HIV/AIDS immediately comes to 
the mind of even the most casual international observer. Indeed, AIDS is, for some, the 
only thing that comes to mind at the mention of the country (and the continent as well). In 
a nation of 44 million people, over one-fifth of the adult population is estimated to be 
infected with HIV, and a full 11% of the population on the whole.39 This tremendous 
burden of disease negatively impacts almost all aspects of South African life, and it is a 
symptom of the great poverty and inequality which mark the country today. It is also a 
product of the country’s complicated and troubled history. 
 The epidemic history of South Africa is essential to addressing the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in the country today. As Howard Phillips explains, “Disease mediates social 
relations.  This is even more the case if a disease develops an all-threatening virulence 
and assumes epidemic proportions.”40 The popular discourse around the HIV/AIDS 
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epidemic assumes that the disaster is a wholly unprecedented one, increasing the stigma 
and general sense of hopelessness associated with the “death sentence” of AIDS. The 
epidemic history, however, shows that HIV/AIDS is with and without precedent.41 In that 
sense, it serves to reveal the origins of the epidemic, the forces that shaped it, and the 
ways to overcome it. 
 Two major themes come to the fore in studying South Africa’s epidemic history: 
the “long pedigree of blaming the victim” and the role of migrant labor in spreading 
disease.42 The social “othering” evident in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa (as 
well as many other regions in the world) has a long tradition in South Africans’ responses 
to illness. It both encouraged and grew out of the deep racism that defined the country for 
many years. In an outbreak of bubonic plague at the turn of the twentieth century, 
segregation of Black Africans was initiated both on the grounds of contemporary 
understandings of sanitation and disease, and because they themselves were seen as “the 
social pest…spreading like an epidemic…undermining all sense of security.”43 This 
social and cultural differentiation underpinned the ideologies of racism and apartheid that 
plagued South Africa for decades, and it would continue to do the same for the country’s 
most recent epidemic.   
One of the most harmful yet fundamental elements of the social response to 
HIV/AIDS is the stigma that is attached to it. It was initially stigmatized in the 1980s as a 
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disease of homosexuals, prostitutes, and IV drug users. As the disease spread to the 
young African population of South Africa, the stigma shifted to that group accordingly. 
The reaction by the apartheid regime to the epidemic clearly parallels the reactions by the 
white populations during previous outbreaks of disease, as with the bubonic plague or 
Spanish Influenza. Virginia van der Vliet described the white South African population in 
the last years of apartheid as trying to maintain their health as a closed community in a 
sea of AIDS.44 This perspective has done little to address the root causes of the epidemic, 
which in fact lay in the policies of the apartheid state.  
One of the most destructive policies of apartheid was to separate a great many 
African men from their families, in order to use them as migrant laborers. Women, 
children, and the elderly were relegated to contrived “native homelands,” while the 
fathers and husbands were sent to labor camps to work the diamond and gold mines, or to 
otherwise serve the white minority. Kept away from home for months, the men in the 
migrant labor camps would turn to prostitutes to fill the sexual void. Sexually transmitted 
diseases moved from the camps to the homelands and back again, driven by the need of 
the apartheid state to access to a large and mobile labor pool.45 The economic policies of 
the apartheid state fueled the spread of HIV within South Africa and between other 
southern African nations. The effects of migration are of course social and cultural as 
well as economic, destroying families and convoluting social values.46 
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Addressing the history of social and economic inequality in South Africa and its 
direct effects of negative health outcomes (especially when looking at AIDS) requires a 
discourse centered on the provision of healthcare as a human right. Social movements, 
growing out of the tradition of anti-apartheid activism, are now beginning to mobilize 
around health. Their pleas are deeply impassioned and morally convincing, showing how 
the new model of bioethics translates into political action on a local scale. The Treatment 
Action Campaign’s push for access to antiretroviral treatment for all those afflicted with 
AIDS in South Africa is an excellent example of how the new proposal for bioethics 
makes possible great achievements when put into action.  
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3. Achievement in the Face of AIDS
AIDS is above all a remediable adversity. Our living and our life forces are stronger, our capacity 
for wholeness as humans is larger, than the individual effects of the virus. Africa seeks healing. 
That healing lies within the power of our own actions. In inviting us to deal with the losses it has 
already inflicted, and, more importantly, in enjoining us to avoid future losses that our own 
capacity to action make necessary, AIDS beckons us to the fullness and power of our own 
humanity. It is not an invitation that we should avoid or refuse. 
 Edwin Cameron, South Africa’s first publicly open HIV-positive official1
The proposal for a new bioethics premised on human rights and social justice is as 
much a challenge as it is a solution. It is no exaggeration to say that working towards the 
provision of health care as a human right is a Herculean task; most would in fact describe 
it as an impossible one. A new health activism reminds us, however, that whether or not 
the ultimate goal of health equity is a realistic one, the important thing, now, is to move 
closer to that ideal. The Treatment Action Campaign is one of the strongest examples of 
what can be achieved by not backing down from the stance that health is a human right,
even in an AIDS epidemic as disastrous as South Africa’s. 
 To make no secret of their basic foundation, the Treatment Action Campaign 
(from here on out, TAC) began on International Human Rights Day in 1998, with only 
fifteen activists. By the end of the day, they had over a thousand signatures from 
passersby in Cape Town, South Africa, who agreed that antiretroviral (ARV) treatment 
should be available to every person in the country for whom it was medically indicated 
(no small number, even in 1998). The spirit of TAC is inextricably linked to the passion 
of its founder and the very basic and very human response that led him to start the 
organization. Zackie Achmat is an HIV-positive former male prostitute and a seasoned 
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50
activist with experience in the anti-apartheid struggle and the push for gay rights in South 
Africa. He announced the beginning of TAC at the funeral of his friend, Simon Nkoli, 
who died because he could not afford ARVs.2 Zackie challenged the perverse logic that 
said some people in the world (mostly those in wealthy countries) and some people in 
South Africa (mostly the wealthy and the powerful) could get treatment for AIDS and its 
opportunistic infections while others could not.  
This impassioned beginning would draw more and more activists to the cause of 
access to ARVs as a human right. Some came from the ranks of anti-apartheid and gay 
rights movements, while many were poor black women whose lives were the ones most 
directly impacted by the virus; either they had it themselves, or they were the caretakers 
of those who were dying from it.3 Though Zackie’s personality was a major part of TAC 
and the AIDS movement as a whole in South Africa, the strength of the moral plea for 
access to ARVs became the backbone of the organization. Their framework was 
decidedly in the mold that Jonathan Mann had envisioned: one rising up out of the 
language of human rights, but ending in action, rather than just analysis. As the TAC 
activist Nathan Geffen describes: “For us, a human rights framework is not merely an 
academic tool, but the fundamental basis of our advocacy.”4
In 1999, Achmat would live the reality of those he was fighting to gain access for. 
He embodied the equality of human life when he refused to go on ARVs himself until all 
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South Africans could obtain it in the public health system.5 Much of TAC’s activism has 
been both successful and powerful because of the ingenuity of its members coupled with 
the undeniable moral strength of its appeal. The issue that TAC mobilized around could 
not be a more important or more pressing one in South Africa, and, in a very real sense, 
the moral obligation to address access to ARVs chose them.  
TAC expected to be primarily squaring off against the powerful and profitable 
pharmaceutical industry that kept drug prices out of the common person’s reach. In late 
2000, they mounted a campaign against the pharmaceutical company Pfizer, seeking to 
wrest monopoly control over life-saving drugs from big business: “The defiance 
campaign demonstrated TAC’s uncompromising determination to increase access to life-
saving medicines for poor people. The group decided to consider importing generic 
fluconazole into South Africa in defiance of Pfizer’s patent rights.”6 Achmat and another 
activist personally carried thousands of doses of generic drugs into South Africa on a 
flight from Thailand. Though illegal, their actions would garner a great deal of media 
attention and public support, eventually humbling Pfizer and other drug companies into 
making substantial donations of the much-needed medicines. The Pharmaceutical 
Researchers and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) was forced by pressure within 
South Africa and internationally to withdraw a lawsuit it had filed against the South 
African government who had followed the lead of Brazil and ignored patent rights in 
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order to allow the use of generic drugs.7 TAC’s insistence that access take priority over 
profits won the day, and it was their appeal to human rights that led to their victory in the 
court of internationally opinion. 
Ironically, the pharmaceutical industry did not prove to be TAC’s toughest 
adversary. Soon after ARVs became increasingly available in South Africa, TAC found 
that the lack of political will in the government towards fighting AIDS was their biggest 
obstacle. The surest way to effectively counter the HIV/AIDS pandemic on a national 
scale has been with a great deal of support from the highest levels of government. In 
Brazil, a country with tremendous inequality like South Africa, the government made 
universal access to ARVs a reality by manufacturing their own generic drugs. Uganda is 
also one of the pandemic’s success stories, with a large reduction in rates made possible 
by the president make HIV prevention and AIDS treatment his top priority.8 The 
magnitude of South Africa’s epidemic makes political will even more important, but 
TAC found that political resistance rather than support came directly from the top, in the 
person of President Thabo Mbeki. 
The dissident science of AIDS denialism appealed to Mbeki, a renowned Third 
World intellectual and who learned his distrust of Western hegemony in the struggle 
against the apartheid regime. He believed the connection between HIV and AIDS to be a 
fallacy meant to dehumanize the African and ignore the poverty that was making his 
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people sick.9 Ironically, Mbeki’s response was a misguided application of some of the 
themes of a health and human rights discourse. He saw that it was poverty and social 
forces that explained why South Africans were becoming sick, but he missed the 
biological role of HIV and AIDS is becoming embodied as social suffering. His response 
was also conditioned by a wariness of the legacy of Western de-stabilization that had 
long kept stable societies willfully ignorant of and complicit in health inequalities. But 
Mbeki’s analysis was thrown of by a misguided cultural politics of race and nationalism: 
Mbeki’s ‘African nationalist’ response to the AIDS pandemic illustrates the workings of a cultural 
politics of identity that diverted attention from working-class and poor people’s struggles for 
access to life-savings AIDS treatment that are accessible to the middle classes. The responses of 
African nationalists and dissidents within government and the ruling party clashed with the class-
based mobilization of AIDS activists and trade unionists who insisted that ARVs be made freely 
available in public health facilities as part of citizens’ constitutional rights to health care.10 
Conditioned to be defensive in the face of Western imperialism, Mbeki spent crucial 
years of the epidemic trying to disprove the link between HIV and AIDS and making sure 
that South Africa’s health system remained wary of ARVs. 
The result was a failure by the Ministry of Health to implement ARV treatment 
programs on a widespread scale, even when pharmaceutical companies like Boehringer-
Ingelheim were offering free drugs and when South Africa’s own licensing board 
approved the drugs for use. The success of treatment programs, like that of Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF), in some of the worst townships, like Khayelitsha, where there 
was little health infrastructure and resources were callously ignored instead of 
 
9 Steven Robins, “’Long live Zackie, long live’: AIDS activism, science, and citizenship after apartheid,” 
Journal of Southern African Studies 30 (2004), pp. 651-672. 
10 Ibid., p.670. 
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duplicated.11 Nothing is more effective in fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other 
health challenges than an abundance of political will. South Africa found that the reverse 
is also true: nothing is more devastating to the HIV/AIDS fight than political resistance to 
realizing health as a human right. TAC, amazed that they had to struggle against the same 
government that they spent the apartheid years being arrested, jailed, and beaten to put 
into power, concluded that they would have to resist Mbeki and the Ministry of Health.  
The civil and political gains of the anti-apartheid movement gave TAC the 
opportunity to mingling new forms of resistance with the time-tested tactic of civil 
disobedience. With the judiciary now in place to ensure their rights, social and economic 
as well as civil and political, TAC was able to use the courts as a resource where it had 
been a mechanism of oppression during apartheid. TAC initiated a lawsuit against the 
Minister of Health, alleging that the failure by the government to make nevirapine widely 
available to pregnant HIV-positive women was a systematic violation of the social and 
economic right to health, protected in the South African Constitution. The drug was free 
and had the potential to greatly reduce mother to child transmission of the virus. The 
court case would be a dramatic turning point for the global realization of health as a 
human right. 
Victory in the Constitutional Court 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
11 Renee C. Fox and Eric Goemaere, “They Call It ‘Patient Selection’ in Khayelitsha: The Experience of 
Medecins Sans Frontieres-South Africa in Enrolling Patients to Receive Antiretroviral Treatment for 
HIV/AIDS,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15 (2006), pp. 302-312. 
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Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights12 
South Africa’s Constitution is unique in that social and economic rights are 
enshrined in law, rather than just being a matter of non-binding international law that 
nation-states routinely ignore. The progressiveness of the Constitution was both a 
response to the domestic history of apartheid as well as the global historical context of 
the fall of Communism; South Africa sought to blend the civil and political rights that 
had been the U.S. domain with the social and economic rights characteristic of the Soviet 
Union. When writing the new Constitution in 1994, the framers looked to the 
International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights, then, in an effort to blend it with 
the more strictly political rights that were a Western preserve.13 In this way, South Africa 
became one of the first and is still one of the only countries in the world to have binding 
universal fundamental rights in the spirit of the modern human rights movement. This 
proved crucial to the TAC case and the fight for ARVs. 
 Presented with a decision by a lower court that ordered the government to take 
“reasonable” steps to “progressively realize” the right to health as enshrined in the 
Constitution, South Africa’s Constitutional Court (equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court) 
issued a ruling in TAC’s favor that shows what can be achieved legally by employing a 
human rights framework to health:   
The Constitutional Court’s order declared that sections 27(1) and (2) required that the government 
devise and implement a comprehensive program to realize progressively the rights of pregnant 
women and their children to have access to health services to prevent mother-child transmission of 
 
12 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed on December 3, 2006 at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>. Emphasis mine. 
13 Joan Fitzpatrick and Ron C. Slye, “Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Minister of Health v. 
Treatment Action Campaign,” The American Journal of International Law 97 (2003), p. 673. 
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HIV. The order further required that the program include testing and counseling. Finally, the 
government was required to remove restrictions on dispensing nevirapine at public hospitals and 
clinics where medically indicated; to make provision, if necessary, for training counselors at 
public hospitals and clinics; and to take reasonable measures to extend testing and counseling 
facilities throughout the public health sector.14 
In some senses, the ruling raises more questions than it answers. But, ultimately, it says 
that health is a human right and the government has a responsibility (conditional) to 
realize it for its citizens. The decision also makes clear that the right is a communal one: 
individuals cannot expect that the government provide services to them on demand. The 
ruling also makes a preferential option for the society’s most vulnerable, following the 
ideology of the common good and social justice. TAC’s victory was nothing short of 
stunning; not only did the Court rule that nevirapine be made widely available, it also 
spurred the government to begin implementing a program to provide ARV treatment 
throughout the country’s public health facilities. It also brought the right to health and the 
right to treatment to the attention of the international community and signified a shift in 
the way the world sees the provision of social and economic rights.15 
TAC’s Social Victories 
Coupled with their legal and material victories is the effect that TAC has had on 
the social sphere surrounding HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Through education and 
awareness campaigns, TAC has greatly reduced the stigma that fueled the South African 
epidemic as it does across the world. It is also argued that the struggle for care and the 
treatment it has won are having extremely positive effects on the psyche of those with the 
 
14 Fitzpatrick and Slye (2003), p. 675. 
15 Leslie London, “Human Rights and Public Health: Dichotomies or Synergies in Developing Countries? 
Examining the Case of HIV in South Africa,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 30 (2002), pp. 677-691. 
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illness as well as the perception of the infected; it has also cultivated a health citizenship 
that can mobilize to make further gains. 
 The “HIV POSITIVE” t-shirt campaign initiated by Zackie Achmat is the most 
visible manifestation of the social effect that TAC has had:  
It has become far beyond South Africa’s borders a symbol of the struggle for justice and reason 
and openness in the AIDS debate. It is worn casually and widely by many thousands of people—
positive and negative—in marches, on the street, at work, and at home. It has done more to lessen 
stigma than innumerable speeches and workshops and think-tanks. It says, as the Danish king did 
in the fable of the yellow star during the Nazi persecution of the Danish Jews: we all bear this 
condition. We are all HIV POSITIVE. We all need treatment to be made available.16 
The effects of stigma are some of the pandemic’s most insidious, making people loathe to 
access treatment even where it is freely available. TAC has done a great deal to reduce 
this stigma in South Africa, though there is a long way to go until there is complete 
openness. Steven Robins, an anthropologist, describes how the road may be made shorter 
by the new “health citizenship” and positive life space created by TAC’s activism and 
gains in treatment. 
 Essentially, Robins argues, the “social death” of stigma and the late stages of 
AIDS bring sufferers to the brink of death which ARVs can bring them back from, giving 
them hope and “new life.” He uses ritual analysis to describe how this commits TAC 
activists to social change and activism, as well as a positive space within South African 
society to pursue rights-based struggles. This new citizenship is deeply tied to both 
human rights and the embodiment of extreme suffering and recovery.17 Looking at 
 
16 Cameron (2005), pp. 129-130. 
17 Steven Robins, “From ‘Rights’ to ‘Ritual’: AIDS Activism in South Africa,” American Anthropologist 
108 (2006), pp. 312-323. 
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TAC’s achievements with a social lens gives an even broader view of their positive 
impact on South African society and the struggle against HIV/AIDS.  
An Ethics of Implementation and Action 
The difference between what we do and what we are capable of doing would suffice to solve most 
of the world’s problems. 
Mahatma Gandhi 
The aftermath of the Constitutional Court decision of 2002 highlights the 
extremely difficult challenges that are necessarily faced when implementing widespread 
health reforms, especially in the developing world. The wording of the decision itself 
raised complicated questions: what was the government obliged to do to carry out 
“progressive realization” of access to ARVs and healthcare more generally? What would 
be considered “reasonable” steps in this direction? The Court made some concrete 
directions, but left the government to decide what was possible within its “limited” 
resources. With this, we return to the primacy of economics and the renewed importance 
of a human rights discourse to set moral priorities. 
 Nicoli Nattrass, an economist at the University of Cape Town, provides the best 
investigation of the “moral economy of AIDS” in South Africa.18 She describes the 
discourse of “unaffordability” within a framework of “moral triage” that is characteristic 
of many global health debates but especially the one around HIV/AIDS care in South 
Africa. Saving the lives of those needing treatment plummets down the priority list vis-à-
vis prevention (a false opposition, since treatment and prevention are complementary) as 
well as the other expenses the state has. Nattrass argues that hiding behind the rhetoric of 
 
18 Nicoli Nattrass, The Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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limited resources is a thin veil for the many moral judgments that must accompany a 
decision not to provide ARV treatment. It involves an inherent devaluing and 
dehumanizing of those vulnerable people who contracted HIV and cannot afford to pay 
for their own care. Most importantly, Nattrass’s economic models show that, in the long 
run, treating those with AIDS will be economically beneficial considering their 
contribution to the workforce as well as the decreased costs of treating the opportunistic 
infections that they would have had.  
 The argument for treatment belies the slow ARV rollout that has followed the 
decision of 2002. With the legal battle won, TAC has had to pressure the government a 
great deal to finally come out with a comprehensive ARV program. The most recent plan, 
for 2007-2011 is the most progressive yet, but it took five years to get to it, and universal 
care is still quite far from being realistic.19 Having obtained access to ARVs in name and 
with a good deal of goodwill donations from pharmaceutical companies, TAC and South 
Africa are confronting the lack of health infrastructure characteristic of most of the 
developing world as well as a “rationing” rhetoric that silences the language of human 
rights. 
 TAC’s successes came mainly in the three urban provinces of South Africa, and 
that is also where successful treatment programs have been set up. Rural health 
infrastructure is severely lacking, with facilities few and far between and health personnel 
nearly non-existent. The “brain drain,” sucking publicly trained doctors away from South 
Africa and other developing countries to work for much higher pay in the industrialized 
 
19 Peter Greste, “South Africa has launched an ambitious five-year plan to combat AIDS,” BBC News at 
<bbc.co.uk/news>, (14 March 2007). 
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world has had an effect that a new mandatory service year for graduating doctors has 
barely addressed. The question now is: what can TAC do to ensure implementation of 
their rights-based victory? Does their model have the potential for action on a wider 
scale, and is it a sustainable model? 
 The answer seems to be that TAC faces great challenges, but not insurmountable 
ones. As for the organization itself, its self-governance is such that it does not rely overly 
much on the personality of Zackie Achmat to maintain its activism and life. Its new 
magazine, Equal Treatment, gives the poor and powerless a voice that they never had 
before.20 A democratic structure and increasing roles for women and the poor within the 
organization ensure that TAC will share in South Africa’s new life. It has also taken 
important steps to realize similar rights-based advances throughout the sub-Saharan 
African region.21 The health as a human right model is taking hold in South Africa and 
elsewhere. Material gains usually amount to an impressive first step, but true health 
equity is a long way off.  
 Bioethics’s role must be to provide an “ethics of implementation” that stresses 
action and results.22 The language of human rights is a language of ideals. As we have 
seen, it is important to voice as a universal ideal, but change will not come all at once. 
There must be a certain degree of pragmatism, one that does not accept things as they are, 
and still struggles to change them. A dangerous discourse that has arisen in the face of 
 
20 “Making HIV Prevention Work,” Equal Treatment November 2006, available online at <tac.org.za>. 
21 Friedman and Mottiar (2004). 
22 Stuart Rennie and Frieda Behets, “AIDS Care and Treatment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implementation 
Ethics,” Hastings Center Report 36 (2006), pp. 23-31. 
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global health challenges is that of “rationing”.23 It hides behind the veil of limited 
resources, just like “unaffordability”, to say, essentially, that what we are doing is all that 
we can do. It makes those in the developed and stable world, who are perpetuating this 
discourse, feel that they have met their moral obligations, while it forces those in the 
developed world keep quiet for fear that they will lose what little they already have.  
Successful programs, like MSF in Khayelitsha, and Paul Farmer’s Partners in 
Health Group in Haiti, have shown that “rationing” is a counterproductive discourse. One 
must maintain the radical ideal of health equity, while only allowing the true constraints 
of no money and no resources to set limits to a project. But this is still unacceptable. One 
must use the language of human rights to keep the moral pressure on those in leadership 
and those with resources to give it as a moral obligation. Health equity must always be 
the goal, even if the powerful would like to pass it off as “unrealistic”. Thus far, these 
programs have remained small, but their numbers are growing. TAC has shown in South 
Africa what it is possible to achieve with a humble start, and they continue to work, 
keeping in mind the implementation challenges in South Africa.24 
To fight for health equity, bioethics must make a substantial shift towards 
examining health inequalities across the world from a social and public health 
perspective. Using the language of human rights, it must be radical in its advocacy of 
new moral priorities in health. This seems like a difficult task, given resource and 
infrastructure constraints, but one statistic puts in perspective how skewed the world’s 
 
23 Sydney Rosen, et al., “Hard Choices: Rationing Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV/AIDS in Africa,” Lancet 
365, pp. 354-356. 
24 Solomon R. Benatar, “Health Care Reform and the Crisis of HIV and AIDS in South Africa,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 351 (2004), pp. 81-92; Fox and Goemaere (2006). 
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priorities really are and how much is really available to achieve the goal of health equity: 
last year, spending on veterinary care for pets in the United States was $9.4 billion.25 
Conversely, for the “exceptional” pandemic of HIV/AIDS, infecting, killing, and 
effecting millions outside of the United States, a paltry $8.3 billion was spent across the 
globe.26 Global society must interrogate its priorities, and a socially contextualized and 
human rights-oriented bioethics has a great role to play in this. By stressing action and 
implementation, bioethics will help to make the universal value of health and well-being 
a reality for all. But how long will it take until we truly consider every human life to be 
equal? 
 
25 The total pet spending was even more troubling; a whopping $38.4 billion. Online at < 
http://www.appma.org/press_releasedetail.asp?id=84>. 
26 Accessed at <www.unaids.org>. 
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Conclusion: An Ethics of Implementation   
The great inequalities in global health that allow some to die preventable deaths 
while others receive too much advanced biomedical care must be erased. Bioethics, as 
first conceived in the West, is not just inadequate in erasing global inequalities but serves 
to manage them by obfuscating the issues of greatest moral priority. Instead of focusing 
on the issues facing the poor children of the developing world who lack food and 
healthcare, the first model of bioethics is content to debate the rights of the unborn in the 
developed world. When it does address the plight of the suffering and powerless, 
bioethics, as in the case of organ sales, often stands on the side of those perpetrating 
injustice, rather than those working against it. The new bioethical paradigm that has 
emerged from the crucible of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and social realities seeks and 
achieves to redress the harm of the first model as well as the greater issues of inequality 
in health.  
 Reflecting on the successes of movements like the Treatment Action Campaign, 
one questions what steps must be taken to broaden the push towards global health equity. 
Small, passionate campaigns have brought the human rights agenda into the public 
consciousness by carrying the torch of radical ideals. This initial impetus is essential to 
change, but it alone cannot succeed. Countless examples, especially in the AIDS fight, 
show that it is political will at the highest levels that is needed to achieve a complete 
society-wide response. There have been positive intermediate steps like the President’s 
Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), that have built on the initial idealist push 
by human rights advocates. But the moral urgency of preventable suffering worldwide 
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obligates us to find effective and thorough interventions that are much more than a 
bandage on the gaping wounds of structural violence and instability. Deeply committed 
social responses require an ethics that sustains the initial moral appeal of health as a 
human right. An ethics of implementation is the next tool in the fight for global health; it 
challenges a cosmopolitan world not just to voice the value of health equity, but to realize 
it. 
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